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TAX REFORM: 
SELECTED ISSUES  
Tim Callan, Claire Keane and John R. Walsh* 
 
 The report of the Commission on Taxation (2009) documents an agenda 
for the reform of taxation at a time when the public finances are under very 
severe pressure. It would undoubtedly be easier to reform taxation at a time 
when the overall tax take could be reduced, rather than when gains and 
losses must balance out in a revenue-neutral fashion. It is still more difficult 
if reforms have to be introduced at a time when, for macroeconomic 
reasons, the overall tax take must rise.1 But even when facing the task of 
increasing revenues, there are choices to be made between increasing rates 
on the existing base, and broadening the base, without an increase in rates. 
As Poterba (2009) stated in this year’s Geary Lecture, a touchstone result in 
public finance is that …the distortionary cost of a tax system depends not on the level 
of tax rates but on the square of tax rates.2 This makes a strong argument for 
base-broadening rather than rate increases, which informs much of the 
report of the Commission on Taxation. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, we address a selection of issues linked by the theme of 
base-broadening; and we consider some aspects of the income tax rate 
structure  which were addressed by the Commission. The two areas of base-
broadening we consider are: 
 
• Introduction of a tax on residential property (Section 2); and 
 • Inclusion of child benefit as part of taxable income (Section 3).  
 
 
* The Economic and Social Research Institute, Whitaker Square, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, 
Dublin 2. Email: tim.callan@esri.ie 
We are grateful to referees for helpful comments; the usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The February 2008 terms of reference for the Commission included keeping “the overall 
tax burden low” and implementation of a carbon tax on a revenue-neutral basis. The 
January 2009 Framework document agreed by the social partners included the following: 
Additionally, given the urgency of the situation and the role that taxation will have to play in bringing 
stability back to the public finances, the Government is asking the Commission on Taxation to identify 
appropriate options to raise tax revenue and to complete its report by September 2009. 
2 The basic result is due to Harberger (1964). There have been many further refinements 
and extensions, but Auerbach and Hines (2001) conclude that Fundamentally, it remains true 
that departures from marginal cost pricing are associated with excess burden, that the magnitude of excess 
burden is roughly proportional to the square of any such departure. 
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Each of these raises issues requiring close investigation, and we use 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model to examine the first-round 
implications of policy changes in these areas.3 The main findings are drawn 
together in the final section. 
 
 
CONTEXT 
2. 
Property Tax A recent OECD study on taxes and economic growth (Johansson et al., 
2008) summarised the main advantages of property as a base for taxation: 
 
• property is immobile, 
 • property taxes are hard to evade or avoid, 
 • property tax revenue can be used to reduce the burden of income 
taxation, and has fewer behavioural consequences than income taxes, 
 • property taxes can offset distortions caused by favourable tax 
treatments of owner occupation which tend to cause overinvestment 
in housing, 
 • property is a major component of wealth, 
 • property is suitable as a local tax base.4 
 
The property tax heading includes recurrent taxes on immovable property 
(paid by both households and businesses), taxes on net wealth (paid by both 
households and corporations), taxes on gifts and inheritance and taxes on 
financial and capital transactions. Johansson et al. (2008) summarise 
empirical work, based on a panel regression covering 21 OECD countries 
over the period 1970 to 2005, suggesting that …recurrent taxes on immovable 
property seem to have the least adverse effect on GDP per capita… They found that 
within the OECD, recurrent taxes on immovable property accounted for 
about half of total property taxes, with taxes on transactions accounting for 
about another quarter.  
 
The balance of taxes within the property tax heading is quite different for 
Ireland. The Commission on Taxation points to Ireland’s heavy reliance on 
stamp duty and transactions taxes in the taxation of property. This imposes 
costs on mobility, including mobility between jobs requiring a change of 
residence. It distorts decisions as to whether to move to a more suitable 
property for changed needs (larger family, empty nest, or change in health 
status) or to adapt an existing property. It also means that stamp duties can 
be particularly sensitive to the state of the economic cycle. Stamp duties had 
been less than half of the “taxes on property” category in the 1990s, but rose 
to be over 70 per cent by 2006.  However, the end of the housing boom has 
seen declines in property values and  in transactions, which have greatly 
reduced revenue from this source in the recent past. Ireland has not had an 
annual tax based on domestic residential property values since the abolition 
of domestic rates in 1978. Both the Commission on Taxation and the 
OECD study point to a further advantage of an annual tax on immovable 
 
3 A third area where they may be scope for base-broadening reform, the tax treatment of 
pensions, was also considered by the Commission. This is the subject of a separate study 
(Callan et al., 2009b). 
4 In this paper we examine the potential for a national property tax; we do not attempt to 
deal with issues of local taxation.  
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property: this tax base is more stable than one based on transactions. 
Indeed, Johansson et al. (2009) state that …tax revenue generated from this tax is 
.... more predictable than for revenues obtained from labour and corporate taxes, partly 
due to less cyclical fluctuation in property values (e.g. Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003).  
RECOMMENDATIONS  OF THE COMMISSION ON TAXATION 
OECD (2006) has stated that Ireland has some of the most generous tax provisions 
for owner-occupied housing, largely because it is the only OECD country that allows a tax 
deduction for mortgage interest payments at the same time as not taxing property values, 
capital gains or imputed rent. In this context, the Commission on Taxation has 
recommended the introduction of an annual tax on residential housing units, 
with liability falling on the owner of the property (whether owner occupier 
or landlord). There would be exceptions for social housing (including local 
authority rented housing)5 and some more limited exceptions such as 
nursing homes and boarding schools. Stamp duty for purchasers of a 
principal private residence would be zero-rated; and the tax would replace 
the €200 charge on second homes recently introduced. Key design features 
of the Commission’s proposal for an annual property tax (APT) include: 
 
• The tax liability be broadly proportionate to the value of the 
property, calculated as a fixed percentage of the midpoint of the 
valuation band into which the property falls.6 
 • The owner(s) of the property would be liable for the tax. 
 • The annual property tax should have regard to ability to pay. In 
particular, the Commission recommends that there should be a 
waiver scheme for those on low incomes, a 10 per cent reduction 
where the principal income earner has …a substantial and permanent 
disability; and a further provision that in some other cases the tax 
could be …deferred and recovered when the property is subsequently sold or 
transferred. 
 
The link between property tax and ability to pay is a crucial one for the 
acceptability of such a tax. One of the main objections raised to an annual 
property tax is that it is “unfair” because it does not take account of the 
difficulties it would pose for low income individuals. The example often 
given is of a widow or pensioner  living in a house  with a value which would 
make for a large property tax bill and would be difficult or impossible to pay 
from a low income. The Commission makes a broad recommendation on 
this issue; we are able to explore what is involved in greater depth, as 
explained in the next sub-sections. 
 
As regards the implementation of a property tax, the Commission 
recommended that the main valuation mechanism should be self-
assessment, subject to appropriate monitoring and audit mechanisms. To 
this end, the development of an up-to-date and consistent valuation database 
is seen as critical, with this database being made available on-line to assist 
taxpayers in valuing their own property. In our view, self-assessment is a 
possible option for use as a valuation mechanism, but not the only one. 
Given that there are fewer transactions than usual in the current housing 
 
5 In the case of local authority housing, the owner/landlord would be the local authority. 
6 For houses in the highest valuation band, there is no midpoint, and actual market values 
are used – there is no “capping” of potential property tax liability. 
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market, and greater uncertainty over house values, it is possible that an 
alternative might be preferred. Modern methods of valuation, using 
statistical models explaining house price variation based on the 
characteristics of the dwelling,7 and the portability of computing power, 
mean that the process of valuation can be completed much more quickly 
than in the past. Experience from the Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland 
Department of Finance and Personnel, 2009) and elsewhere (McCluskey and 
Adair, 1997) suggest that development of a valuation database could be 
achieved within a relatively short time frame. Thus, in our view, the 
Commission’s recommendation of a property tax should not be seen as 
hinging on the use of self-assessment as a valuation mechanism; there are 
alternatives which could also be used to implement their design in a 
relatively short time frame. 
ANNUAL PROPERTY TAX: ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
In order to examine the potential impact of an annual property tax with an 
income-related full or partial waiver, we need a suitable database. This must 
contain a nationally representative sample of households, with information 
on the value of the house or apartment, and detailed information on the 
incomes and family relationships of those living in the dwelling. The Central 
Statistics Office Survey on Income and Living Conditions8 provides such 
information, and our analysis is based on the data from that survey for the 
year 2005.9 We have, however, made a number of adjustments to take 
account of developments in income and in the housing market since that 
time. We also need to be able to simulate the rules of the property tax 
system, and of a waiver scheme related to income and/or other 
characteristics of the owner of the property. This is provided by an 
extension of SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, to include options for a 
tax on owner-occupied property, and for a full or partial waiver of that tax 
depending on income. 
 
The property tax we analyse is very similar in structure to that 
recommended by the Commission on Taxation, but there are some 
differences. Chief among these is the fact that the property tax we analyse 
does not apply to rental property, but only to owner occupied property. This 
is because data on house values are only gathered for owner-occupiers in the 
survey. There are also issues around the appropriate treatment of the rental 
sector,10 but we are unable to explore these with the data currently available. 
However, given the high rate of owner-occupation, and the fact that the 
Commission excludes both local authority tenants and the social housing 
sector from the remit of its Annual Property Tax, the analysis here comes 
close to capturing the main effects of a tax as proposed by the Commission. 
 
 
7 These are know as “hedonic” pricing models, and are widely used. The permanent 
tsb/ESRI house price index is based on this approach. 
8 The survey is known as EU SILC, as it is conducted in all EU countries with a view to 
providing comparable statistics on income and living conditions. 
9 The estimated value of the housing stock is close to the product of the number of 
dwellings (Department of the Environment) and the standardised average house price 
(permanent tsb/ESRI series).  
10 It may be appropriate to have some form of property tax for the rental sector, as 
discussed in Callan et al. (2009a) but it should not be assumed that this would have exactly 
the same form – or the same goals – as a property tax on the owner-occupied sector. 
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A second difference is that the Commission proposes the use of banded 
house values, whereas our analysis looks at the use of discrete market values 
as reported by respondents to the survey. Compared with a discrete value 
system, the banded system can be seen as involving a higher payment for 
those with house values in the lower half of the band, and a lower payment 
for those in the top half of the house value band. The reason for adopting a 
banded system seems to be a practical one: that the introduction of a system 
based on discrete values would take longer to set up. Nevertheless, a banded 
system could be a stepping stone towards a discrete value system and the 
overall impact of the banded system proposed by the Commission can be 
expected to be broadly similar to that of the discrete system. 
 
Full details of the methods and assumptions used in the analysis, and 
more detailed results on the potential impact of an annual property tax on 
households are available in a companion paper (Callan et al., 2009a). Here we 
concentrate on three main aspects: 
 
• The relationship between a property tax and ability pay, under 
different forms of a low income exemption scheme. 
 • The regional distribution of the revenue raised by a property tax. 
 • Transitional arrangements affecting those who have paid stamp duty 
during recent years. 
 
The next three subsections deal with each of these issues in turn. 
PROPERTY TAX AND ABILITY TO PAY 
We compare three forms of property tax. The first might be termed a simple 
property tax, with liability related only to the value of the property, and 
having no extra component related to ability to pay. This case is useful as a 
benchmark against which to measure the effectiveness of income exemption 
schemes in limiting the impact on lower income earners – it is not intended 
as a policy proposal. The other two variants have an income limit below 
which no property tax is paid (either €12,000 per annum, roughly the level of 
the State Contributory Pension, or €15,000 per annum), and a “rebate 
withdrawal rate”11 which sees property tax liability rise by 20 cent for every 
euro of income above that limit. The income concept used in both of these 
variants is income adjusted to take account of the needs of families of 
different sizes and age compositions. The adjustment is done using an adult 
equivalence scale, with the first adult in the family counting as 1, and a 
second or subsequent adult as 0.66, to take account of economies of scale. 
Children are counted as having needs equivalent to 0.33 of those of the first 
adult. This is the national equivalence scale used by CSO in monitoring both 
the “at risk of poverty” measure and the “consistent poverty” target, and 
close to the scale implicit in the payment rates for  social welfare schemes. In 
all cases, the rate of property tax assumed is 0.4 per cent of property value –  
 
 
 
 
 
11 This is equivalent to the marginal relief rate in the income tax code. Those with a full 
exemption can be thought of as getting a rebate equal to the full value of their property tax 
liability, with this rebate being reduced by 20 cent for each euro of income above the 
income exemption limit. 
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a  figure  chosen to  arrive at a revenue of approximately €1,000 million  per 
annum.12 
Table 1: Revenue Impact of Alternative Waivers and Rebates for Property 
 Tax 
 
 
Income Exemption Limit
(Annual Disposable 
Income Per Adult 
Equivalent) 
Rebate 
Withdrawal 
Rate 
(%) 
Revenue 
€Million  Per 
Annum 
 
Simple property tax 0 n.a. 1,101 
 
Property tax with income 
exemption limit and 
marginal relief €12,000 20 973 
 
Property tax with income 
exemption limit and 
marginal relief €15,000 20 906 
 
Note: A tax rate of 0.4 per cent is applied in all cases. 
 
Table 1 summarises the main results in terms of the overall revenue that 
could be collected under each of these schemes. A simple property tax with 
no income exemption limit would raise about €1,100 million per annum. A 
tax with an income exemption limit of €12,000, and a rebate withdrawal rate 
of 20 per cent, would raise about €970 million. Extending the income limit 
further up the scale to €15,000 per annum would see the revenue fall to just 
over €900 million. Thus, the alternative schemes with income exemption 
limits would retain between 80 and 90 per cent of the maximum potential 
revenue. 
 
How would the distributional impact of a property tax be affected by 
these different approaches? Table 2 summarises the impacts at different 
income levels, dividing the population into 10 equal sized groups from those 
with lowest to those with highest income (“deciles”). The income criterion 
used takes account of differences in family size and age composition in the 
manner described earlier (i.e., uses income per adult equivalent). A simple 
property tax with no income-related relief would see losses of between 1 and 
2 per cent for those in the bottom 30 per cent of the income distribution. 
An income exemption limit of €12,000 per annum would eliminate losses 
for the bottom 10 per cent, limit them to 0.3 per cent for the next decile, 
and reduce them from almost 2 per cent to 1 per cent for the third decile. A 
higher income limit of €15,000 per annum could eliminate losses for the 20 
per cent of households with lowest incomes, and limit losses to 0.2 per cent 
for the third decile. 
 
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that an income exemption limit, 
along with a gradual withdrawal of the full rebate, could be used to relate 
property tax liability to ability to pay,  limiting the impact on those on the 
lowest incomes. At the same time, the property tax could raise between 80 
 
12 The total revenue is a product of the rate and the value of the owner-occupied housing 
stock. The rate required to generate €1,000 million depends on the value of the housing 
stock; the conservative assumption adopted on the path of house prices means that the rate 
required to generate this revenue may be less than 0.4 per cent. The Commission looked at 
rates of 0.25 and 0.30 per cent. 
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and 90 per cent of the maximum revenue. In part, this reflects the fact that 
those with low incomes tend also to have lower valued property on average. 
The existence of a low income rebate or full waiver would, of course, imply 
an increase in the effective marginal tax rate on income of those benefiting 
from a rebate. However, it seems that the proportion affected in this way 
would be not dissimilar to those in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland. 
Table 2: Distributional Impact of a Property Tax With and Without Income 
Exemptions  
Decile 
 
Adjusted Net 
Income Per 
Week  
% Change in Income 
for Income Group  
 
More 
Than 
Less 
Than 
Simple 
Property 
Tax 
Income Exemption 
Limit of €12,000 
Income 
Exemption 
Limit of 
€15,000 
 
Lowest  204 -1.0 0 0 
2 204 263 -1.4 -0.3 0 
3 263 325 -1.9 -1.0 -0.2 
4 325 396 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 
5 396 449 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
6 449 519 -1.3 -1.2 -1.2 
7 519 605 -1.3 -1.2 -1.2 
8 605 711 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 
9 711 889 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Highest 889  -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
Total   -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 
      
Note: Each decile contains 10 per cent of all households, from those with lowest incomes up 
to those with the highest incomes. A property tax rate of 0.4 per cent of owner-occupied 
property is assumed throughout. Where an income exemption limit applies, the rebate 
withdrawal rate is 20 per cent. 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY TAX 
What about the regional distribution of revenue from property tax? A 
combination of factors led to the former Residential Property Tax raising 
close to three-quarters of its revenue from the Dublin area. How would a 
property tax of the type examined here compare? Table 3 shows how the 
share of revenue raised under a property tax (with  a rate of 0.4 per cent and 
an income cut off of €12,000) varies across regions, and, for comparison, the 
shares of the regions in population and in disposable income.13 
 
Dublin accounts for a higher share of the yield from property tax than its 
share in the population of households. However, Dublin also has a higher 
share of disposable income, indicating a higher than average income. Given 
the progressivity of the income tax code, the share of Dublin in the gross 
income would be higher than 44 per cent, and its share in the revenue from 
income tax would be higher again. Thus, while Dublin’s share in the 
property tax is above its share in the population, it is not so far above its 
share in income or income tax – and a long way below the share it 
contributed in the narrower Residential Property tax. 
 
13 As the property tax revenue must come from SWITCH simulations, disposable income is 
also simulated in this framework. 
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Table 3: Regional Shares of Population, Income and Property Tax 
    
Region 
 
Households 
 
Disposable 
Income 
Property  
Tax Revenue 
 % % % 
Border 9 7 6 
Midland 5 4 3 
West 8 6 6 
Dublin 36 44 52 
Mid-East 9 9 10 
Mid-West 7 7 5 
South-East 10 7 6 
South-West 16 14 12 
Total 100 100 100 
    
 
TRANSITIONAL RELIEF 
The Commission recommends that, as a transitional arrangement, all those 
who have paid stamp duty should be exempt from property tax for a period 
of seven years from the year in which they paid stamp duty. This is to reflect 
the fact that …many home owners paid considerable amounts of stamp duty… 
particularly from 2000 up to 2008. In our view a transitional arrangement of 
this type is essential in making the transition from a system based on 
payment of taxes at the time of purchase to a system based on an annual tax. 
It may be, however, that a more refined system is needed. For example, the 
amount of stamp duty paid depends in part on the point of the house price 
cycle at which the purchase took place. A recent purchaser of a house may 
have paid much less in both stamp duty (and purchase price) than the buyer 
of a similar house at the peak of the cycle in late 2006/early 2007; but the 
system proposed by the Commission would give greater relief to the later 
purchaser. Similarly, the amount of stamp duty paid depends on the rates 
and rules of stamp duty in force at the time. Again, purchasers in recent 
years have benefited from a lowering of rates and the shift to a banded 
system, whereas earlier purchasers paid stamp duty at higher rates. Thus, in 
order to make the outcomes more equitable, a system may need to be 
devised which takes greater account of actual stamp duty paid, while 
discounting for the passage of time, possibly treating the stamp duty as a 
“prepayment” of property tax. In this event, the relief would use a formula 
which mimics the annual property tax which would have been payable if that 
tax had been introduced at the time of the house purchase. 
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Child benefit is currently paid in respect of all children under 16 years of 
age, and those aged 16 or 17 years in full time education.14 Currently child 
benefit is not included in the definition of income for taxation purposes. 
The Commission advised that Child Benefit should be included in taxable 
income,15 but that this suggestion should be compared to the alternatives 
(such as means testing). The Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers 
and Expenditure Programmes also suggests either making Child Benefit taxable, 
making it a means-tested benefit or reducing rates to arrive at a 20 per cent 
cut in expenditure. The Report advises that savings of over €500 million 
could be achieved by creating a standard rate of €136 a month. Currently, if 
a family has three or more children they receive a rate of €166 for the first 
two children and a higher rate of €203 for the third or subsequent children. 
The rationale for this approach was that larger families were found to be at 
greater risk of poverty, so that a policy offering greater support to larger 
families could help to reduce poverty risk in a targeted way.16 
3. 
Taxable 
Child Benefit  
 
There is extensive research on the structure of child income support 
which can be used to inform this choice.  An increased, taxable child benefit 
was analysed by Callan (1991). Nolan (1993) reviewed the multiple 
objectives of child income support and proposed a reduction in child 
dependant additions, along with an increased, taxable child benefit. Callan et 
al. (2006) reviewed both taxable child benefit and a form of means-tested 
payment labelled “Child Benefit Supplement”, designed to replace the child 
additions payable with social welfare payments, and, at least partially, the 
Family Income Supplement Scheme17 Policy over the 1990s and the early 
years of this decade did not follow any of these paths. Instead, child benefit 
was increased without making it taxable. The options now being considered, 
in the face of the fiscal crisis, are: 
 
• A cut in payment rates. This could maintain the current higher rate 
for large families, or, as proposed by The Report of the Special 
Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, 
move to a standardised payment rate. 
 • Move to means-testing of the payment. 
 • Include child benefit in taxable income, so that those on the lowest 
incomes would be protected, and those on the highest incomes 
would see the greatest reduction in “net” child benefit payments. 
 
A means test on Child Benefit would involve a new “benefit withdrawal 
rate” which acts to increase effective marginal tax rates. Thus it could lead to 
a disimprovement in the balance between income in work and income out 
of work, and would certainly lead to higher marginal tax rates facing some of 
those in work. Making the payment taxable would also lead to some impact 
on marginal tax rates, as some of those with children would move to a 
 
14 A half-rate payment is made in respect of 18 year olds at present, but Budget 2009 
indicated that this would cease from January 2010. 
15 “Taxation of child benefit” is sometimes taken to mean that the payment would itself be 
reduced. The “inclusion of child benefit in taxable income” or “making child benefit 
taxable” are more precise descriptions of the policy change envisaged. Child benefit is 
usually paid to the mother, and the amount paid in this way would be unchanged.  
16 Akerlof (1978) shows how “tagging” based on income-related characteristics can provide 
a better outcome than directly relating payments to income. 
17 Initially known as “child dependant additions” and currently known as “qualified child 
increases”. 
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higher tax rate, or into the tax net – but the net impact on incentives would 
be lower. The least impact on financial work incentives would arise from the 
“rate-cutting” option, which would reduce income in work and in 
unemployment by the same amount, leaving the gap between the two 
unchanged. 
 
What of the distributive effects of the alternatives? Here we focus on the 
taxable child benefit and rate cut options. The impact of the means-testing 
option depends crucially on the level of income at which withdrawal of 
benefit would begin, and on the rate of benefit withdrawal. There is no 
indication in official documents of how these parameters would be set.  
 
Using the ESRI tax benefit model, SWITCH, it is possible to examine the 
overall impact of reducing Child Benefit rates or, alternatively, including 
Child Benefit in taxable income. SWITCH is based on a large scale, 
nationally representative sample of households and allows analysis to be 
carried out at tax unit level. Along with providing an estimate of savings that 
can be made for the exchequer it also allows us to examine the numbers 
affected by the policy change, the effects across the income distribution and 
the effect on poverty risk. Our survey-based estimate indicates a saving of  
about €450 million can be made by reducing the Child Benefit rate to €136 
per month. This represents about 88 per cent of the impact as estimated by 
the Special Group; but a key advantage of the microsimulation approach is 
that we can identify how this impact differs across the income distribution.   
The inclusion of Child Benefit in taxable income could result in an increase 
in tax revenue in the region of €370 million per year. The Commission 
proposed a a tax credit to offset the additional tax payable in respect of child 
benefit for those in the lower half of the income scale. It is not clear  how 
this would be structured, but a tax credit which was only available to those 
in the lower half of the income distribution would have to be withdrawn 
gradually – making it more like a means-tested system. For both of these 
reasons, we do not attempt to simulate this here, and keep taxable child 
benefit, means-testing and rate-cutting as distinct options. The introduction 
of such a tax credit would reduce the Exchequer’s tax revenue but would 
lessen the negative impact on the income of those in lower income deciles.  
 
Reducing Child Benefit rates affects a larger number of tax units in the 
middle of the income distribution compared to the higher and lower end of 
the income distribution. As expected, making child benefit taxable affects a 
relatively small number of tax units in the bottom two income deciles as 
lower income deciles have a smaller tax liability due to low income levels. 
Figure 1 shows the average percentage loss in disposable income by income 
decile under the two approaches. Reducing the Child Benefit rates to a 
standard €140 per month  results in an average loss in disposable income of 
1 per cent for the lowest income quintile compared to a loss of 0.2 per cent 
for the highest income quintile. Making Child Benefit taxable results in a fall 
of disposable income of 0.2 percent for the lowest income decile compared 
to a 0.4 per cent reduction for the highest earners. A reduction in the Child 
Benefit rates, therefore, has a larger negative impact on disposable income 
for those on lower incomes compared to making Child Benefit taxable. It 
also results in a smaller loss for the upper income deciles compared to the 
inclusion of Child Benefit in taxable income.  
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in Disposable Income for Alternative Child 
Benefit Policy Changes: Making Child Benefit Taxable Versus 
Reduction in Child Benefit Payment Rates  
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
Low est income 2 3 4 Highest
Decile of income per adult equivalent
%
Child Benefit
reduction
Taxable Child Benefit
 
Finally, we can examine the impact on child poverty rates of the two 
alternatives compared to the current 2009 budget. We focus on one of the 
key measures used by the EU Commission, the “at risk of poverty” measure, 
based on an income poverty line at 60 per cent of median income per adult 
equivalent. Reducing the rate of Child Benefit to €136 is associated with an 
increase of 1.2 percentage points in the head count version of the “at risk of 
poverty” measure for children. The inclusion of Child Benefit in taxable 
income would lead to a smaller increase of 0.6 percentage points. When a 
“poverty gap” measure is used, taking account of the depth as well as the 
extent of income poverty, the taxation option leads to a 3 per cent increase 
whereas the reduction to a new standard payment leads to a 17 per cent 
increase. 
 
In our view, the inclusion of Child Benefit in taxable income provides a 
better structure for child income support. It allows for the possibility of 
effecting reductions in aggregate Child Benefit expenditure while affording 
protection to those on the lowest incomes. It has been indicated that there 
are serious technical difficulties in implementing such a change within a year. 
If it would take longer to implement such a policy, this should still be the 
medium term goal. In current circumstances, one could envisage, for 
example,  a commitment to move to this structure, with temporary cuts in 
Child Benefit payment rates to be restored when Child Benefit is made 
taxable. 
 
 This paper has looked at two main areas for broadening of the tax base: an 
annual tax on property and Child Benefit.   4. 
Conclusions  
Key findings from our analysis include the following: 
 
• A property tax could raise substantial revenue, even when account is 
taken of an income exemption limit and marginal relief which ensure 
that there are few losses, if any, among those on the lowest incomes 
(the lowest 20 to 30 per cent of the income distribution). 
 • The share of property tax payable by those resident in the Dublin 
region would be similar to their share of income tax. 
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• We compared the inclusion of child benefit in the income tax base 
and a cut in child benefit rates to achieve the same net reduction in 
exchequer cost. This showed that the inclusion of Child Benefit in 
taxable income allows for the possibility of effecting reductions in 
aggregate Child Benefit expenditure while affording protection to 
those on the lowest incomes. 
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APPENDIX: SIMULATING 
WELFARE AND INCOME 
TAX CHANGES 
(SWITCH) 
When considering the potential impact of tax changes, calculations are 
often undertaken for just a small number of illustrative families. This 
approach has severe limitations. For example, less than one family in 20 falls 
into the category of “one-earner couple with 2 children” which attracts so 
much attention at budget time. Furthermore families within this category 
differ in terms of income, housing tenure, and other characteristics that 
affect their tax-benefit position. More fundamentally, analysis of 
hypothetical families - no matter how well chosen - simply cannot give an 
overall picture of the impact of a policy change on incomes and work 
incentives.  For this reason, in many countries policy changes are assessed 
using tax-benefit models which are based on large-scale nationally 
representative samples of households. This ensures that the models 
represent as fully as possible the great diversity of household circumstances 
relevant to tax and social welfare. Several countries including the UK and 
the US have models which are maintained and used by official departments 
or agencies, as well as models developed and used in the academic sector 
(e.g., the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Tax Policy Center in Washington 
and the Microsimulation Unit at the University of Essex). In Ireland, the 
ESRI has developed a microsimulation model of the Irish tax and benefit 
systems, SWITCH (Simulating Welfare and Income Tax CHanges). 
 
The current SWITCH database uses data from the EU’s Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) for the year 2005. The survey 
contains detailed information on more than 6,000 households including 
about 15,000 individuals. These data include detailed information on 
household size and composition, labour market participation, incomes from 
work and occupational pensions, and from receipts of social welfare 
payments. The SWITCH database is adjusted from year to year to allow for 
key changes in incomes and population structure as forecast for the next 
budgetary year. Changes in social welfare rates, income tax rates, bands and 
allowances, and the structure of employee PRSI are taken into account 
within the model. Using these data the model has been developed to 
simulate the rules of the welfare and tax systems so as to allow it to predict 
the tax liabilities and welfare entitlements of respondents under the existing 
tax/welfare rules and under alternative reforms. 
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The capabilities of the model include: 
 
• Estimation of the net budgetary cost of packages of tax and welfare 
changes. Alternative reform packages with the same budgetary cost 
can therefore be constructed. 
 • Estimation of the pattern of gains and losses from a policy change. 
The numbers of families gaining and losing and the size of their 
gains and losses can be estimated, and the distribution of gains and 
losses across family types and income levels can be explored. 
 • Estimation of the impact of policy changes on effective marginal tax 
rates.  
 
The model has now been extended to allow for the modelling of various 
property tax options. This required the use of data contained in the survey 
on house values, and the establishment of a set of rules for modelling 
property tax liability. Full details can be found in Callan et al. (2009a). While 
the permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index has fallen just under 25 per cent 
from its peak in early 2007, we allow for a greater fall in order to arrive at a 
somewhat conservative estimate of potential revenue from a property tax. 
The discount factor applied to the values reported by respondents in 2005 is 
one-third, implying an even greater fall from the peak values in late 
2006/early 2007. This assumption is not a forecast, and it differs somewhat 
from the assumption used by the Commission itself in its analysis. However, 
as the revenue potential depends not only on the value of the housing stock, 
but on the product of this value and the rate applied, this does not affect the 
relevance of the analysis of the distributional impact under alternative waiver 
schemes. 
 
 
 
 
